
CHILD LABOR POLICY IN DEMOGRAPHY BONUS UTILIZATION

Fajar Ajie Setiawan¹, Elis Rusmiati², Tubagus Adi Satria P³, Fitriana Putri Hapsari⁴.
Department of International Relation (Universitas Wanita Internasional)
Kampus Universitas Moetopo Beragama
Anggota Komite Pemantau Resiko (Dewan Pengawas BPJS Kesehatan)
Department of International Relation (Universitas Lintas Internasional Indonesia)

*Correspondence: ajie.hatadji@gmail.com

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

received
revised
accepted

Keywords:

Child labor; demography bonus;
population quality; policy
coordination.

ABSTRACT

Indonesia is facing a dilemmatic demographic bonus. The high number of productive-age population will rapidly increase national economic growth, but without quality improvement, Indonesia will be burdened by high numbers of unskilled labor. It prompts a need for policy priority regarding the quality improvement for population to obtain a comprehensive study on policy priority which has been made by stakeholders in regards to child labor as a preventive action, and to accurately devise intervention recommendations. This research was conducted using exploratory qualitative approach, analyzing field data obtained on purposefully selected provinces of North Sumatra and Bangka Belitung. Data collected using primary sources (field observations, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions) and secondary sources (desk study using descriptive statistic and literatures). Result shows that the root problem of child labor is the pull of economic activity that offers attractive income for families. Another root problem is poverty and the desire of children to earn their own money. Many obstacles were faced by the policymaker in implementing a sustainable child labor policy, such as: 1) unstable policy coordination, 2) lack of commitment and conflict of interest between stakeholders and policy maker, 3) effectiveness of socialization methods, and 4) lack of synergy due to sectoral ego that occurred in various related institutions in the regions. In terms of the demographic bonus, child labor policy implementation should be comprehensive and followed by operational policies that offer reward and punishment for the family, such as socio-economic incentives.

INTRODUCTION

Based on the UCW (2012) report the number of children aged 7-14 years is still working reaching 2.3 million people and of that nearly 1.4 million children under the age of 13 currently working, and nearly 650 thousand children aged 13-14 years' work in general (not light). Most of these are workers in the natural resource sector and are non-formal. If studied based on the population of the province then the area with the highest number of child laborers is West Java and East Java but if viewed based on regional region then the eastern region of Sumatra, Sulawesi and Eastern Region of Indonesia have more

percentage. At the same time 19% or 1/5 of the adolescent population aged 15-24 are unemployed (BPS, 2010). Many teenagers today (19%), especially adolescent girls who are in an inactive position, where they are not active in the workforce are also inactive in school. This is a challenge because there's lost population productivity and should be optimized for demographic bonuses.

One of the key concerns in the UCW report is the fact that 96% of active child laborers working in families are unpaid workers (UCW, 2012). In addition, many child workers are found in hazardous work sites where 985,000 children aged 5-14 years or 44% of

the total working children work in the neighborhood. The hazardous environment is a workplace that deals with dangerous objects, dust, heat, extreme temperatures, fire and gas, chemicals, dangerous altitudes, dangerous machinery and equipment. The existence of child labor in the neighborhood is closely related to the related industrial sectors, including agriculture, mining and manufacturing.

Child labor has become the world's spotlight on Indonesia. One of them related to mine, The British Guardian magazine highlighting the role of Apple Inc. over the rapid pace of child labor and youth employed in tin mines in the Bangka Islands (Hodal, 2012). Also related to the handling of child labor in various sectors in North Sumatra. This does not mean that there has been no effort from the Government and Local Government. Since 2008 until now, the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration has made withdrawal of child labor from the workplace of 32,663 people and returned to education unit (BPS, 2010). Child Labor Reduction activities were carried out as part of the implementation of the National Action Plan for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (RAN-PBPTA) as mandated by Presidential Decree no. 59 of 2002, which in this year entered Phase 3 (Year 2013 - 2022).

All national legal norms clearly regulate this issue and Indonesia already has a commitment to reduce significantly. Unfortunately, until now the efforts to decrease the number of child labor has not significantly affected. In fact more than half of today's teenage unemployed have been unemployed in the span of 12 months. While those underemployed (working <35h / week) account for one third of the total teenagers who work and tend to be unproductive. Many of these underemployments are found to be working in the informal sector. In this group, adolescents should receive a low quality informal sector work where getting out of the group is very difficult without education. The above description provides an overview of the demographic bonus of Indonesia is now experiencing a dilemma, which on the one hand can be a great opportunity for economic growth but if we are not ready with the quality, then Indonesia will face high unemployment burden. This makes the

importance of population controls still very high and still necessary to suppress many things other than the population.

Reflecting on the background then the authors intend to examine the urgency of preparing the quality of child labor and adolescents ahead of demographic bonuses to be included as a priority target achievement of development. On the basis of the question raised the question of how policy priorities have been given so far by local stakeholders in controlling child labor and adolescents and preparing them for demographic bonuses and how policy interventions need to be recommended so that child labor control can be accurately and precisely done in preparing bonuses demographics.

Based on these questions, the study aims to: 1) obtain a comprehensive overview of policy priorities given so far by local stakeholders in controlling child labor and preparing them for demographic bonuses; and 2) obtain accurate policy intervention recommendation recommendations related to efforts to control child labor and adolescence in order to prepare and demographic bonuses.

Answering the questions and objectives of the study will provide a comprehensive overview of the policy priorities provided by local stakeholders in controlling child labor and adolescents and recommendations for policy interventions for the control of child and adolescent workers in preparation for demographic bonuses.

METHOD

Research of Fares and Raju (2007) said that:

Across countries, a negative correlation between child labor and income is found but this relationship is not linear and indicates that at very low levels of income, the effect of changes in per capita income on the incidence of child labor is the highest.

This means that low per capita income leads to an increase in child labor. Besides, Fares and Raju said that (2007):

The size of the agriculture sector in the economy remains strongly associated with the incidence of child work.

This means that agriculture sectors such as agriculture and livestock encourage increased child labor. Poverty is often the cause and cause of the emergence of child labor issues (Goonesekere, 1998). Demographics within the family such as age and sex of the child, the education level of the head of the family, as well as the size of the family influence in the decision to attract children from school and work (Edmonds, 2009). These factors are closely related to household consumption as well as household economic capacity which are a major factor in the determination of child labor (Akarro and Mtweve, 2011). The higher cost of household consumption compared to the head of household income tends to encourage child labor from the family to increase household income. In other words, poverty within the family can be a major cause of child labor practices. Ashagrie (1997) classifies a child who can be called a worker if 'economically active'. Basu (1999) adds the argument that governments and international organizations typically use the term 'economically active' in the sense that a person works regularly, paid, it goes into the market. He then examines the factors driving the practice of child labor with a household behavior approach using the Bargaining Model. He explained that child labor occurs as a negative impact of the failure of implementation of this model (Basu, 1999):

Models involving bargaining can and have been used to explain child labor and the level of wellbeing of children, though by and large such efforts treat child labor not as the focus of analysis but fallout of general household modeling.

In relation to the existence of child labor practices in Indonesia, Irwanto and Natalia (2011) conducted a review of legislation, laws and programs on the elimination of child labor in Indonesia. This review opens by critiquing the late classification distinction between children in employment and child labor which was only done in 2009 through BPS publication entitled "Indonesian Child Labor Survey". Another criticism is the failure of Law No.13 of 2003 to describe and provide an example of the definition of 'light work' so prone to misinterpretation and misappropriation. They then outlined the prevalence of child labor in Indonesia, as well

as the basis and legal protection of children at the national level, such as the government's success to prevent and tackle child labor cases in the footwear, garment and fishery industries (Irwanto and Natalia, 2011, p. 6-8).

Based on previous review, according Udry (2006):

The most effective way to draw children out of damaging work is to encourage school attendance. One way of doing so would be to improve school quality, and therefore increase the gain to attending school

He said that in reducing child labor policy actors should encourage the presence of children in school and by giving awareness of the benefits of school is very important. This awareness can also arise based on parental understanding. Meanwhile, according to Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2009):


Reducing child labor will require parents to be farsighted (i.e., to recognize the future returns to schooling) and to be able to engage in costly long-horizon investments (either through internal funding or borrowing)

Thus, parents' awareness of the importance of education for children as future investment becomes very important to be created while still providing access to capital for parents in the future. Access to capital for parents is very important to encourage parents to achieve income that can replace the needs covered by the child's results when working. Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti in other studies stated that:

We find that households respond to transitory income shocks by increasing child labor, but that the extent to which child labor is used as a buffer is lower when households have access to credit.

Based on these studies, to reduce child labor, the policy to be taken is to provide access to credit to households. Thus, the framework of this research is as follows:

Chart 1 Framework



On the other hand, the policy must also be able to ensure the parents really choose to have their children go to school without any other better option. According to Dessy and Knowles (2008):

child labor laws may increase the welfare of poor households in an ex ante sense by allowing parents to achieve a higher level of education for their children than they would be able to achieve with an unconstrained choice set

Their research shows that the policy of child labor can improve the welfare of poor households if the policy is able to force parents to ultimately choose to educate children higher than other alternative options.

The research was conducted qualitatively with explorative approach by collecting primary data in the form of field observation, In-depth interview and Focus Group Discussion and conducted desk study using secondary data in the form of descriptive statistics and analysis of literature data for later analyzed qualitatively by using field data obtained cross sectional in two selected provinces namely Bangka Belitung and North Sumatra. Research object is Province having high child labor level based on data of Understanding Child Work report (ILO-UNDP-World Bank, 2012). The provinces representing the characteristics of high child labor and high population growth also have special characteristics such as Bangka Belitung and North Sumatra.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

A. Main Problem

If examined based on the root of the problem, the emergence of the phenomenon of children working in the Islands of Bangka Belitung is closely related to the existence of the IT mine and the economic situation at the family level. It is difficult for the head of household to deny the attraction of income to be gained from working in the mining sector. This not only encourages the arrival of formal workers but also non-formal workers with low levels of education at an IT mine. Nevertheless, based on the root of the problem, at least some of the main problems are: 1) the strong economic attractiveness caused by tin mining, 2) the declining interest of school children, 3) the high migration of migrant population, and 4) people's mindset. Faced with this situation it is necessary to review the extent to which policy actors take up the role so that the extent of policy coverage is able to overcome the existing problems related to the existence of child labor and demographic bonuses.


If it is examined, the root cause of the rampant child labor is inseparable from family economic factors, not because of the pull of certain economic sectors. In general, according to various sources, child labor in North Sumatra generally comes from families who tend to have low incomes so they work to help their families in the nearest sector from where they live. Those living in the vicinity of plantations will work on plantations, living near urban areas that are experiencing growth in residential areas and industries working in various family businesses such as brick kilns, and offshore generally work in the fishery sector including jermal and TPI as well as tobacco plantations (ILO, 2007). There are many more types of work of child laborers in North Sumatra. This condition indicates that the fulfillment of the need is more as the pull of working children rather than the pull of one economic sector, where the choice of sector depends on geographical conditions. While the results of the study also show that the root causes of child labor in North Sumatra in general are 1) the difficulty of the local community's economy, 2) the existence of child labor as a supporter of the family economy and 3) the desire of the child to have the money so as to fulfill his own unmet

needs.

These are interrelated and cause children to get caught in a dilemmatic condition between their desire to stay in school, get an education and their desire to immediately meet their own needs and help the family economy. This condition necessarily requires the intervention of stakeholders to immediately overcome them.

Based on the root of the problem, it is found that basically there is a root similarity where there is a market of child labor, which is a meeting between the supply and demand sides. From the supply side, the root of the main problems is the attractiveness of economic activity that occurs in the region geographically and the offer of obtaining liquid money and directly accepted by child laborers (Egeh, 2013). From the demand side, the issue of poverty is the family's economic difficulty factor or poverty and the high desire of children to earn their own income. These four major issues become complementary in nature, which in turn leads to child labor. It can be clearly described as follows:

Chart 2. Root Problem of Child Labor



1) Attractiveness of Local Economic Activities, Interesting Wage Offers and Population Migration

The attractiveness of local economic activity is a very obvious element in both Bangka and Deli Serdang. This local economic pull is due to the growing economy in both

regions, where the Bangka economy is currently driven by the very fast tin mining industry and Deli Serdang is encouraged by the growth of Medan metropolitan area that grow long ago and always supported by Deli Serdang as buffer.

The phenomenon of child labor which is often highlighted is generally based in Deli area including in Deli Serdang Regency. Deli Serdang district as a buffer zone of Medan is very closely related to the character of the region that experienced the impact of the most rapid economic growth. Structural transformation occurs significantly from plantation agriculture to industry. The rapid transformation in various sectors occurring in the Deli Serdang regency gave birth to the worst forms of child labor also occurred covering various sectors, such as plantation, livestock, fishery, household and industry. Similarly, Bangka Regency which has the widest area as well as a buffer of Pangkal Pinang city has undergone significant structural transformation into a tin mining area previously only limited to areas owned by PT. Timah.

The pull of the local economy in these two regions increases the wage boost and purchasing power of people to meet their needs. This is in line with the statement of Todaro (1998) in his theory which assumes that population migration is essentially a result of an economic phenomenon. The decision made to migrate is rational. This economic phenomenon is clearly an attraction especially for rural communities that have been living sub-systems; this is in line with the theory of Arthur Lewis in Todaro (1998) who observed the existence of two-sector economy, the rural sub-sector agriculture sector and a capitalistic industry. In rural areas with large populations there is an excess supply of labor and sub-systems or is already optimal and difficult to develop. In contrast, the industrial sector has a shortage of manpower and its production function is not yet at the optimum level that can be achieved.

The high productivity in industry makes the real wage rate per worker in urban area is also high. This causes many workers to move into the industrial sector especially children. Unfortunately, this Arthur Lewis transformation in Bangka Island attracts very

remote communities such as from Java, Banten, Sumatra and even Bugis to migrate to Bangka Island, which encourages population growth and excessive mining exploitation. Child labor is a resultant of a very rapid process of structural transformation but not accompanied by balanced human resource quality. Economic pressures put pressure on families to maximize revenue that can be gained through the growth of the area that occurred both in Deli Serdang and in Bangka Belitung.

The process of rural-urban migration, causing the development of cities and industries. Industrial development should lead to the accumulation of physical capital and human resources. The further consequences are the declining rate of population growth and the smaller size of the family. However, the opinion of Arthur Lewis does not occur in the context of Bangka Belitung and Deli Serdang, precisely the migration process that encourages rapid population growth in the Bangka and Metropolitan Islands of Medan (Deli Serdang included).

2) Family Economic Pressure and Child Desire to Work.

From the micro side, especially at the family level, the root of the problem that causes the rise of child labor is inseparable from the element of family economic pressure, not merely because of the pull of certain economic sectors. In general, according to various sources, child laborers in North Sumatra and Bangka Belitung generally come from families who tend to have low incomes so they work to help their families in the nearest sector from where they live (Dirjen Balance of Finance, 2012). Communities living in the vicinity of plantations will work on plantations, living near urban areas experiencing growth in residential areas and industries working in various family businesses such as brick kilns, and offshore generally working in the fishery sector including jermal and TPI as well as tobacco plantations (ILO, 2007). There are many more types of work of child laborers in North Sumatra. The condition indicates that the fulfillment of the family's need to be a working child puller where the choice of sector depends on geographical conditions.

The description in the previous section shows that the root causes of child labor in Deli Serdang and Kabupaten Bangka are generally the same. Where the drive to work often comes from the wishes of the child but parents tend not to forbid and support. This becomes the mindset to change. However, the reason they want to work is rooted in the existence of child labor as a supporter of the family economy and ultimately encourages the desire of the child to have the money so as to meet his own needs and family. Individual and Family Relationships become important in the child's economic action to work (Sen, 1989). This is because the family according to Anderson and Parker (1964) is the primary institution in society whose main functions include the function of biological reproduction, economic sustainability, education and socialization as well as the transmission of ownership and culture. Although the functions and forms have changed from year to year, the stability of family economic sustainability remains a major concern in any society. Strengthening that statement, according to William J. Goode (1982) family duties are the direct responsibility of every person in society, with one or two exceptions, almost every person born in the family will form his own family. Taking the opinion of Anderson, Parker or Goode is then rational if the child then takes the option of participating in sustaining the family economy when other family members are unable to meet the needs of the family or at least the needs of the child itself. Child's interest in family economic interests and self-fulfilling needs, for some children to encourage them to drop out of school and not to go to school like a child from a migrant family in Bangka. This is in line with Udry's (2006) opinion where he describes:

The most effective way to draw children out of damaging work is to encourage school attendance. One way of doing so would be to improve school quality, and therefore increase the gain to attending school.

He explained that the most effective way to avoid children from hazardous work is to encourage their attendance at school. What is noteworthy is the fact that on the pitch the child keeps working even though he goes to school as is often the case in brick and lead tin

refineries. This shows that Udri's opinion is not always appropriate that the presence of children in school can encourage children out of their jobs. Working hours that are not tied to normal working hours allow children to make the decision not to be tied to school. Especially for children who work as family workers.

Individual relationships within families and economic interests are intertwined and cause children to get caught in a dilemmatic state between their desire to stay in school, get an education and their desire to immediately meet their own needs and help the family economy. This condition necessarily requires the intervention of stakeholders to immediately overcome them.

2) The Role of Policy Intervention in the Handling of Child Laborers

Table 1 Condition of Existing Policy Implementation

The Role of Child Labor Policy Actors	Bangka Belitung (Kab. Bangka)	Sumatera Utara (Kab. Deli Serdang)
Aparattus Understanding	Not Similar	Not Similar
Commitment, Priority of Policy	Not exist	Exist, weak
Policy Coordination	Exist, weak	Exist
Socialization, Advocacy	Exist, weak	Exist
Cross Sector Synergy	Not Exist	Exist

Based on the analysis in the previous section on the role of policy actors in the regions there are 5 policy issues that arise and need to be attention and comparison. The first issue is the extent to which policy officers in each region understand the issue of child labor; second, the extent to which child labor policy is a priority in activities; third, the extent to which coordination occurs between stakeholders; fourth; the extent to which socialization and policy advocacy are undertaken and the extent to which cross-sectoral synergies are established in each region in the handling of child labor. In relation to the first issue, both Bangka Belitung and North Sumatra have a different understanding of officers relating to child

labor, particularly in the technical service, on the other hand the issue of child labor is a cross-cutting issue that should be addressed in a common understanding of the urgency and direction of policy to be taken.

In both provinces few SKPDs have a deep understanding of child labor. North Sumatra, despite its long experience in handling child labor, is still facing a similar conflict so that in some instances policy actors acting as leading sectors often have difficulty in following up coordination. The success of North Sumatra several years ago in the elimination of child labor on jermals already awarded by the ILO has not been able to equate the understanding of existing policy actors who should be able to eliminate child labor in other sectors. According to Charles O. Jones (1996) stakeholder interpretation of the policy will determine the success of the policy itself; this means that child labor management policies can be implemented in other sectors only if there is an understanding in interpreting the child labor handling policy itself. The common understanding of policy actors strongly determines the commitment of decision makers to see where the policy priorities will be taken in relation to child labor. In relation to the second issue, the commitment of policy actors to the issue of child labor is demonstrated by the commitment of policy actors in placing the issue of child labor in policy planning priorities of the institution. In reality, in Bangka Belitung, commitment among policy actors has not been established at all, there is no specific priority in provincial and district policy planning. In Kabupaten Bangka itself, commitment to the handling of new child labor is given from the aspect of K3 implementation. The lack of commitment is also evident from the inconsistency of the Bangka Regent's decision on the establishment of the worst child labor supervision committee that has been proposed since 2011. Without the policy umbrella, the priority in the budget itself is difficult to achieve.

While in North Sumatra, the commitment in placing child labor as a priority has actually existed and has been proven in the handling of jermal. At the provincial level, these commitments are basically still in particular in the direct related agencies of child labor policy development in which this issue becomes their

work priority. Unfortunately, this is not prioritized by policy actors from other related agencies who are shown by not prioritizing this in their planning activities and budgets submitted to Bappeda. This can happen because the commitment to the policy is still different. Whereas according to Edwards III (1980):

not only must implementers know what to do and have the capability to do it, but they must desire to carry out a policy.

Policy actors should not only know to know what and how or capable but also must have a passion in this commitment to the success of the policy. Related to the third issue, coordination related to handling child labor issue. In Bangka Belitung Province and in Kab. Bangka, this coordination issue complained by the informant who became the leading sector related to child labor. It can be said, during this coordination is very difficult to do even followed up because political will other policy makers to solve the problem of child labor. Sectoral ego factors and weak understanding also become one of the causes of weak coordination that can be done by the Provincial Government of Bangka Belitung and Kab. Bangka.

Coordination in the Province of North Sumatra and Kab. Deli Serdang actually has been running well especially in the offices that have direct authority in the policy of handling child labor. However, not all coordinating Dinas can be followed up properly, as is often the case, coordination only ends in the meeting because the focal point always alternates people who sometimes even come from very different *tupoksi*, so, it is not very effective in coordination. The existence of a focal point remains important for follow-up coordination. Finally, follow-up coordination between agencies is not optimal, many programs that have the potential to help tackle issues related to child labor are difficult to develop concretely.

The next issue is the socialization of policies. In Bangka Belitung especially Kab. Bangka, the socialization was done very limited by the Ministry of Mining and Energy related K3 to the official mining companies to prohibit children in the mining environment. Socialization was also conducted in rural areas

that were pockets of mine camp camps, but socialization was limited because of the authority that could not intervene further. The limitations of similar authorities are also recognized by the DisnakertransKab. Bangka is difficult to intervene outside the official job market. This issue of authority ultimately affects the difficulty of obtaining data on working children. However, during this limited socialization related to mining policy in Kab. Bangka can be a short-term solution to overcome the weak barriers of policy development but this socialization itself is difficult to follow up if not accompanied by real and synergic coordination.

In North Sumatra, socialization has actually been running well in all levels, but socialization has been a problem in the coordination of child labor handling. On-the-ground socialization is often hampered by stakeholders due to the limited budget allocation making it difficult to maintain its sustainability and poor understanding of the stakeholders themselves. In addition to maintaining the sustainability of socialization and understanding of the apparatus, another issue is the socialization pattern that has not been effectively touching other stakeholders or the community. Socialization at corporate employer level, often the company sends an incompetent representative so that in the end the result of socialization is not conveyed. Direct socialization in the community including for the parents themselves are already running but difficulties actually occur in collecting the community and difficult to follow up the results of socialization. Another socialization is directly to children in the field. One of the activities undertaken for the socialization of children is through the establishment of a children's forum. This activity is already underway and effectively done up to the village level, but the problem is how to replicate it in other areas that are hampered by stakeholder understanding and priority issues.

The last issue is cross-sector synergy. With a good synergy between the government and the private sector as the employer and CSR, with civil society for example, NGOs and with the community directly then the handling of child labor should be solved. The problem is that this synergy is difficult to achieve in the field due to sectoral ego factors and

differences in understanding and interests. In Bangka Belitung, this synergy has not been seen at all, the synergy between each agency has not been formed to overcome the problems of children working together.

In North Sumatra, cross-sectoral synergies have proven to be effective in alleviating child labor on jermals. Currently, the synergy is still emerging, for example in Kab. Deli Serdang especially in the formation of Community Reading Community which involves many stakeholders from district government, business actors through CSR, NGOs and local community components. However, to follow-up significantly on a broader level remains a challenge especially the synergy between local government agencies and NGOs that sometimes work independently without involving wider stakeholders. This sectoral ego factor should always arise in the dynamics of relationships between institutions, especially in areas where trust and reciprocity are difficult to establish well between stakeholders, whereas it is necessary to build social capital. According to Rachbini (2002) understanding of social capital can be understood as a network of social relations demonstrated by the norms of trust and reciprocity that the results lead to mutual benefits. This social capital should be built to create cross-sector synergies that are capable of handling child labor optimally throughout the work field.

The above description shows that in encouraging the policy of handling child labor, it is necessary to carry out continuous coordination, understanding of good policy practitioners, effective socialization of the society, and involvement of all stakeholders in synergy between government, private sector (CSR), NGOs, employers, communities, families and child laborers themselves.

B. Readiness To Demographic Bonus

In relation to the issue of handling child labor in Bangka Belitung and North Sumatra, the linkage is the fact that the productivity of working children will decline as they enter the workforce because they will be replaced by the next generation of working children, while when they enter the workforce they are faced with weak skills they have due to the loss of education during their active work at the age

of the child. This dilemma is a problem in handling child labor in various sectors facing demographic bonus that happened in Bangka Belitung and Sumut.

1) Readiness of Bangka Belitung Province To Demographic Bonus

In relation to demographic bonuses there is an interesting fact that the growth of the population rate is increasing due to the rise of the people's mines that encourage incoming migrants by bringing their families, including their children. According to the source of the Disnakertrans of Bangka-Belitung Province: "Behind the high demographic bonus in Bangka, there are many obstacles, the demographic bonuses in Bangka are demographic bonuses from immigrants entering Bangka in recent years." This is also acknowledged by one of Kabid BKKBN of Bangka Belitung Province where he stated:

Newcomers are starting to emerge. This is evident from the Growth Rate of Population that rose dramatically, this is obviously immigrants.

Head of Bappeda Bangka Belitung Nazalyus describes the fact that the rapid growth of the population is much influenced by the migration factor of outsiders to Bangka Belitung.

Even unnoticed by the national stakeholders, Bangka Belitung Islands have begun to enter the era of demographic bonuses at least this has happened in Pangkal Pinang City. Pangkal Pinang Mayor Zulkarnain Karim, as quoted from Harian Bangka Pos (15 August 2012) stated that Pangkal Pinang is in demographic bonus status. Where the productive age population is the dominant population in Pangkal Pinang. According to the Disdukcapil Pangkal Pinang data as quoted from the news, the population of Pangkal Pinang 213,613 inhabitants, while based on the quotation according to BappedaPangkal Pinang, the population growth of Pangkal Pinang 3.5 percent. This exceeds the national estimate where demographic bonuses occur in 2020, he explains:

We even in 2009 have experienced a demographic bonus. Where in Pangkal Pinang these productive age population 17-64 years in Pangkal Pinang. This is because the migration of the population that occurred in Pangkal Pinang.

Zulkarnain describes the migration of extraordinary people over a decade. But the problem is, this migration is done by a group of people in the informal sector. The fact that occurred in Pangkal Pinang shows that the demographic bonus that occurred in Bangka Belitung is closely related to the presence of productive immigrant population and of course bringing wife and children. This is where the linkage of children working in tin mines with demographic bonuses that occur in Bangka Belitung. Without handling the improvement of human resources working children then in some time to come when they enter the age of productive teenagers would be the bonus will be the burden of development in Bangka Belitung because they only depend on the mining sector. Unfortunately, this immigrant population is very dependent on existing mining. Head of Bappeda Bangka Belitung Nazalyus as quoted from Antara News explained:

The problem is, even though the value of migration is high, but our employment is still dependent on one sector of mining, we cannot yet provide other sectors.

The problem as explained in the root section of the problem, the problem is that incoming migrants generally do not have the skills, so their children including teenagers also do not go to school so it is feared that demographic bonus will only be a burden. Responding to the problem of increasing the skill of the migrant population, especially the age of adolescents in order not to be a burden in the future required a significant increase in the quality of human resources. However, to realize this, weak coordination is still a problem. Weak coordination appears at the low utilization of the Training Center (BLK) that has been provided, especially the utilization by the immigrants. This was revealed by one of the speakers of Disnakertrans of Bangka Belitung Province who delivered:

The quality of human resources is down, we in the province have BLK and the budget to train it, only coordination is not clear. While their standard of living is now dependent only on tin, the economy is now down because the price of tin goes down, so people's lives are down, while BLK is hard to find people to

train because they have to have ID cards, the packages are finally idle, because we are hard to find respondents.

Recognized by informants related to the difficulty of BLK is not running because the lack of information and socialization itself does not appear, especially coordination was not running. At the FGD meeting held at the Provincial level the source of the Disnakertrans Province is committed to be ready to cooperate with the Disnakertrans of Bangka Belitung Province in particular to provide the necessary certification for the implementation of BLK.

The above description shows Bangka's too high economic dependence on the people's mining sector, the future will have a negative impact on the demographic bonus because when the output of tin mining decreases while the productive age population which is currently no children has increased skills, will produce optimal productivity for the economy that should have emerged as a result of demographic bonuses.

Various innovations are needed to provide a way out in an effort to improve the skills of young people, including in alleviating child labor so that Bangka Belitung is ready to face the Demographic Bonus. In fact there is no master plan or master plan prepared against the demographic bonus that has occurred in Bangka Belitung. Thus a comprehensive effort from the demographic stakeholder is needed so that the problem of preparing the quality of the population, including the elimination of child labor can be solved to the root of the problem so that the benefits can be taken in the era of demographic bonuses along with the rapid economic growth in Bangka Belitung.

2) Readiness of Sumatera Utara To Demographic Bonus

North Sumatra has a dilemma when it is associated with demographic bonuses. Currently North Sumatra is faced with a huge population explosion even including the highest. If the baby boom faced by North Sumatra is now getting adequate quality in the future then the demographic bonus will be obtained, but without the right policy to face the demographic bonus, the baby boom generation will become a development burden. Based on the results of the Indonesian Demographic and Health Survey (SDKI) total

fertility read (TFR) of North Sumatra only fell from 3.8 to 3.0. While national TFR 2.6. This slow population decline is coupled with a very high population spike in which Sumut is included in 10 provinces with the highest population growth rate with Banten, DKI Jakarta, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java, Lampung, West Sumatera, South Sumatera and South Sulawesi. The explosion of the population in North Sumatra is of concern to the central level. Since long, North Sumatra has become the center of economic growth and population, especially in Sumatra. The influx of population migration, especially to the plantation area, has emerged in both tobacco and palm oil. Currently the flow is still a lot of entry, especially around the metropolitan Medan including Deli Serdang. Based on the various informants interviewed, the Javanese and Minang tribes are the largest incoming migrants since 4-3 generations back. Conversely, North Sumatra is also faced with the high flow of out migration that occurred in North Sumatra. In fact many of the inhabitants of North Sumatra are actually productive to move outside of North Sumatra. According to Surianingsih (2006) in addition to incoming migrants as well, North Sumatra is experiencing outbound migrants where the people of North Sumatra migrate from their region to the outside provinces with various motivations. According to him, DKI Jakarta is the main destination of migrants from North Sumatra because of the great appeal of Jakarta City in accordance with its position as the center of government, education, trade and so on. Furthermore, the second largest number of migrants coming out is with the aim of Riau Province.

This shows that economic pressure and job competition between indigenous peoples and migrants are issues that need to be addressed and addressed. But that is not less important precisely on the other side of the growth center outside of North Sumatra actually even attract productive age society running out of North Sumatra. It also shows that economic pull in other provinces such as Riau and DKI Jakarta actually now stronger than North Sumatra.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that the high level of child labor as a non productive age and minimal skill also shows the quality of North Sumatra's un-established economy where North Sumatra is still heavily

dependent on economic sectors that rely on non-formal economy, low wages and low skill quality. This will have an impact when the demographic bonus occurs where the productivity obtained by North Sumatra is not proportional to the number of existing productive age population.

This description shows that the economic pressure faced by North Sumatra is a problem that must be addressed in the face of demographic bonuses and on the other hand the policy to improve the quality of human life including education should be encouraged significantly so that the current population explosion can be a positive value in the future.

It has also been realized by the governor of North Sumatra recently in one of his speeches related to population:

To realize that, would be easier with qualified human resources. Economic growth is certainly not far from the economic resilience and welfare of each family.

To face the various phenomena currently North Sumatra has had a grand design residence 2011-2035. This grand design will become a reference in the preparation of long-term Development Plans (PJPD) and Regional Medium-Term Development Plans (RPJMD) as well as providing input and guidance for cross-sectoral, stakeholder, private institutions, academics and local government in population-oriented development planning.

C. Demographic Bonus, Child Labor and Policy Solution

The above description shows that the increasing economy of North Sumatra and Bangka Belitung currently in fact only causes pressure on the other hand. North Sumatra with increasing economies that still has to compete with other provinces and Bangka Belitung with high dependence on mining impact on the emergence of child labor or child work.

The height of working children is closely related to the economic pressure experienced by families in Kab. Deli Serdang and Kab. Bangka. Family economic pressure where the head of household has low income as happened in Deli Serdang and high migrants with minimal economic ability as attracted by the tin mining sector as happened Kab.

Bangka encourages children to participate in family income buffers. This is in line with the description of Fares and Raju (2007):

Across countries, a negative correlation between child labor and income is found but this relationship is not linear and indicates that at very low levels of income, the effect of changes in per capita income on the incidence of child labor is the highest.

This means that low per capita incomes lead to an increase in child labor. This shows that economic pressure and job competition between indigenous peoples and migrants are issues that need to be addressed and addressed. But that is not less important precisely on the other side of the growth center outside of North Sumatra actually even attract productive age society running out of North Sumatra. It also shows that the economic pull in other provinces such as Riau and DKI Jakarta actually now stronger than North Sumatra.

The high rate of child labor as a non productive age and minimal skill indicates an uneconomical quality of North Sumatra where North Sumatra relies heavily on economic sectors that rely on plantations and agriculture, non-formal economy, low wages and low skill quality. According to Fares and Raju (2007):

The size of the agriculture sector in the economy remains strongly associated with the incidence of child work.

This means that agriculture sectors such as agriculture and livestock do encourage the increase in child labor. This will have an impact when the demographic bonus occurs where the productivity obtained by North Sumatra is not proportional to the number of existing productive age population. While excessive Bangka's economic dependence on the people's mining sector will have a negative impact on demographic bonuses because when the output of tin mining declines while the productive age population which is currently a child (including working children) does not experience skill increases, the productive age population will not result in optimal productivity for the economy that should have arisen due to demographic bonuses.

While on the other hand policy intervention in Bangka Belitung is still very minimal. The

efforts undertaken are still limited to socialization that is centered on the central policy, whereas the handling of child labor policy in the long term requires real policy from local policy actors. This is in line with Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) research which revealed that long-term handling of child labor requires support for legislation and socio-economic incentives. This social economic incentive should also be created to reduce child labor in both provinces. This has proven to be effective in eliminating child labor on Jermals, which is given skill and replacement work on an ongoing basis as an incentive. Socio-economic incentives policies such as education for children or economic support for parents should be encouraged by policy actors in both provinces.

In terms of education, the policy of increasing attendance at schools should be encouraged by the two provinces significantly so that child labor declines and the current population explosion can be a positive value in the future. This is as disclosed Udry (2006) that the presence of children in school and by providing awareness of the benefits of school is very important. This awareness can also arise based on parental understanding. This is also supported by the statement According to Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2003):

Reducing child labor will require parents to be farsighted (i.e., to recognize the future returns to schooling) and to be able to engage in costly long-horizon investments (either through internal funding or borrowing

Thus the awareness of parents of the importance of education for children but still is considered how parents still able to meet the future investment cost of their children. As outlined in the conceptual framework, parental understanding as discussed in the previous chapter is indeed a separate issue. This relies heavily on the parent's mindset and of course this should be intervened by the policy actors so that parents can still meet the needs of the family in full that has been assisted by his children. The policy cannot be just a ban, but must be able to force parents to send their children well. This is as revealed by Dessy and Knowles (2008), that the policy of child labor can improve the welfare of poor households if the policy is able to force the

parents in the end choose to send children higher than alternative alternatives.

However, the policy should also be able to provide the best way out for families where on the one hand the family does not lose income, the children can go to school well and the parents are given economic opportunities so the policy that must be taken is to give credit access to the household (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2003). Thus the policy must also remain to provide an economic exit. The example of the implementation of UUPKS of Deli Serdang Beringin Sub-district getting capital assistance for the development of a brick kiln business is a good example and should be able to eliminate child labor rather than vice versa.

Thus it can be concluded that towards the demographic bonus, the policy of handling child labor must be done comprehensively. The policy solution cannot be solely done with the socialization of policy alone, but also must be followed by operational technical policy that is able to provide reward and punishment for the family. In other words on the micro-side the policy not only prohibits but also provides a way out for families facing economic pressures that occur. On the macro side, the two provinces must be able to improve the quality of human competitiveness and the competitiveness of the local economy so that it does not depend only on certain existing sector and economic pull from other regions. Thus the future of child labor upon entering the productive age can contribute not only to the family but also to the region.

CONCLUSION

Based on the study that has been done, it can be concluded that basically there is a root similarity where there is a child labor market, which is a meeting between the supply and demand sides. In terms of supply, the root of the main problems is the attractiveness of geographical economic activity and attractive money-making offerings. From the demand side, the root of the main problem is the family's economic difficulty factor or poverty and the high desire of the children to earn their own income. These four major issues

become complementary in nature, which in turn leads to child labor.

The obstacles faced by policy actors in the handling of child labor so far are the difficulty of maintaining the sustainability of coordination, differences in understanding and weak commitment of policy actors, the effectiveness of socialization and the lack of synergy among stakeholders due to the sectoral ego attitudes occurring in various related institutions in the region. Handling of child labor needs to pay attention to the family side itself. In general, education policy only improves school access without seeing the child's interest to attend. Though understanding of children and parents about the importance of education as a future investment is needed. On the other hand the parental mindset is difficult to change because there is no better choice than to let the child work. In this case Social economic incentives are a solution that has not been properly regulated to handle child labor in Indonesia.

In terms of demographic bonuses, it can be concluded the policy of handling child labor must be done comprehensively. The policy solution cannot be solely done with the socialization of policy alone, but also must be followed by operational technical policy that is able to provide reward and punishment for the family. In other words, from a micro perspective, policy does not simply prohibit but also provides a way out for families facing economic pressures that occur. From the macro side, the two provinces must be able to improve the quality of human competitiveness and the competitiveness of the local economy so that it does not depend only on certain existing sector and economic pull from other regions.

Based on these conclusions, this research recommends several things. Firstly, in encouraging the policy of handling child labor, it is necessary to have continuous coordination, understanding of good policy practitioners, effective socialization of the society, and involvement of all stakeholders synergistically between government, private (CSR), NGO, work, community, family and child labor itself.

Second, the policy of socio-economic incentives, either in the form of education for the child or economic support for parents, should be encouraged by the policy actors. In terms of education, there needs to be strict policies and rules to encourage the desire of the children to go to school so as to achieve a significant increase in school attendance by one of them with full funding for child laborers who want to go to school. Thus child labor decreases and the current population explosion can be a positive value in the future. From the socioeconomic side, the policy should also be able to provide the best way out for families where on the one hand the family does not lose income and on the other hand the children can go to school well. This can be pursued by providing opportunities for parents of child laborers to gain wider access to the economy.

Third, in terms of macro policy, public policy planning in this case RPJMN, RPJMD Province, District and City should be directed to the demographic bonus priority through improving the quality of human competitiveness and increasing the competitiveness of the local economy so that the future economy of the population of a province is not dependent only in certain existing sectors and economic pull from other regions.

REFERENCE

- Akarro, R. R., & Mtwewe, N. A. 2011. Poverty and Its Association with Child Labour in Njombe District in Tanzania: The Case of Igima Ward. *Current Research Journal of Social Science*, 3(3), 199-206.
- Anderson, W. A., & Parker, F. B. 1964. *Society: Its Organization and Operation*. New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
- Ashagrie, K. 1997. *Statistics on Working Children and Hazardous Child Labour in Brief*. Geneva: ILO.
- Basu, K. 1999. Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 37(3), 1083-1119.
- Beegle, K., Dehejia, R., & Gatti, R. 2003. *Child labor, income shocks, and access to credit*. New York: World Bank.
- Beegle, K., Dehejia, R., & Gatti, R. 2009. Why should we care about child labor? The education, labor market, and health consequences of child labor. *Journal of Human Resources*, 44(4), 871-889.
- BPS. 2010. *Pekerja Anak di Indonesia 2009*. Jakarta: BPS.
- Dessy, S., & Knowles, J. 2008. Why is child labor illegal? *European Economic Review*, 52(7), 1275-1311.
- Dirjen Perimbangan Keuangan. 2012. *Tinjauan Ekonomi & Keuangan Daerah Provinsi Bangka Belitung*. Jakarta: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia. Taken back from the Ministry of Finance.
- Edmonds, E. V. 2009. *Defining child labour: A review of the definitions of child labour in policy research*. International Labour Office, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). Geneva: ILO.
- Edward III, G. C. 1980. *Implementing Public Policy, Congressional Quarterly Inc, USA*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Egeh, B. 2013. *DCI Annual Report 2012*. Geneva: Defence for Children International.
- Fares, J., & Raju, D. 2007. Child labor across the developing world: Patterns and correlations. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*(No. 4119), hal. 32.
- Goode, W. J. 1982. *The Family* (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Gooneskere, S. 1998. *Children, Law, and Justice: A South Asian Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Grootaert, C., & Kanbur, R. 1995. *Child Labor: A Review*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1454. New York: World Bank.
- Hodal, K. 2012. *Death metal: tin mining in Indonesia*. Taken Back from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/23/tin-mining-indonesia-bangka>
- ILO. 2007. *Pekerja Anak di Perkebunan Tembakau Sumatera Utara*. Jakarta: ILO Indonesia.
- Irwanto, & Natalia, S. 2011. *Review on Legislations, Policies, and Programs For The Elimination of Child Labour in Indonesia*. Jakarta: ILO-IPEC.

- Jones, C. O. 1996. *Pengantar Kebijakan Publik*. (N. Budiman, Translator.) Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada.
- Rachbini, D. J. 2002. *Ekonomi politik: paradigma dan teori pilihan publik*. Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia.
- Sen, A. 1989. Cooperation, inequality, and the family. *Population and Development Review*, 15, 61-76.
- Surianingsih. 2006. Pola Migrasi di Provinsi Sumatera Utara. *Jurnal Equality*, 11(2), 143-150.
- Todaro, M. P. 1998. *Pembangunan Ekonomi Di Dunia Ketiga*. Jakarta : Erlangga.
- UCW. 2012. *Understanding Children's Work and Youth Employment Outcomes in Indonesia*. Rome: UCW.
- Udry, C. 2006. Child Labor. *Understanding Poverty*, 243-258.